Going live....lessons from Terminal 5 by Baker, Peter
Going live...
A key measure of success for any project must be what 
customers experience immediately after the ‘go live’ date.   
When projects become fully operational, how often is there  
a negative impact on customer service?  
hen it comes to large projects, 
there is a strong tendency for top 
management to be focussed on 
the state-of-the-art infrastructure that is being 
introduced, whether it is a new distribution 
centre, computer system or airport terminal.  
While the long-term benefits of the new 
infrastructure may be unquestionable, this 
‘management focus’ can often deflect attention 
away from the customer, who, as the Terminal 
5 opening showed, may be severely affected by 
the transfer of the ongoing operation.  Sadly the 
importance of the ‘go live’ period is a frequently 
neglected area of project implementations.
In today’s rapidly changing markets, managers 
are increasingly focussed on multi-disciplinary 
projects in order to re-engineer business to 
provide a competitive advantage.  In fact many 
managers may spend more time on project 
work than on traditional line management 
responsibilities.  By their very nature new 
projects tend to be exciting – at least in the first 
few months or years of their life.  However, key 
project personnel are often seeking to move 
on before the project finishes.  While the initial 
design may be exciting, the operational detail of 
the ‘go live’ phase may seem rather mundane in 
comparison, and is often passed to day-to-day 
managers near the end of the project.   
Unless the operational management has 
been the key driving force behind the project 
from its initiation, then there is a real danger 
that the ‘go live’ phase does not receive the 
attention it deserves.
While this decrease in interest may be 
happening at the project management level, 
senior management are obviously very 
interested in a new project reaching the 
commissioning stage and look forward to 
the benefits that this will bring.  However, 
again the focus is likely to be on the overall 
design of the infrastructure and how this 
will eventually benefit customer service and 
profitability.  The transfer of the ongoing 
operation is frequently regarded as a detail, 
not worthy of the same attention.
Should this ‘detail’ of transferring the ongoing 
operation be regarded more seriously by 
senior and project management teams?  The 
experience of the opening of Terminal 5 
would suggest that this should be the case 
and in fact, this is supported by previous 
research at Cranfield School of Management 
into warehouse automation projects – 
many of which happened to involve similar 
sortation technology as the baggage handling 
systems at Terminal 5.
Terminal 5 – success or failure?
It can be argued that Heathrow Terminal 5 was an 
outstanding success with the project reportedly 
completed on time and within budget.  Awards 
have been given for its architectural design and the 
new terminal provides a platform for delivering 
higher customer service levels than were previously 
possible at Terminals 1 and 4.
Similarly, it could be argued that the planning for the 
‘go live’ phase was extensive and thorough with 
preparations including:
a six year construction programme•	
400,000 man hours of software engineering  •	
  for the 17 kilometres of conveyors
six months of training staff and testing systems•	
15,000 volunteers conducting 66 trials•	
32 aircraft trials•	
baggage system tested (fully loaded) 20 times  •	
  prior to opening
Nevertheless, the ‘go live’ was a customer and public 
relations disaster.  As reported in the media, there were 
long queues and delays at the terminal, thousands of 
bags went missing (28,000 not with owners four days 
after opening) and many flights were cancelled (about 
500 in the first two weeks).  The backlog of baggage 
was so severe that many were forwarded to Milan and 
the USA for sorting and despatch to the last known 
addresses of customers.  In addition, some insurance 
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“...We compromised on the testing of 
the building as a result of delays in the 
building programme. If I was to pick on 
one issue that I would do differently...
it is that particular issue.” 
 Source:  Minutes of evidence taken before the 
House of Commons Transport Committee, 7 May 2008.
Willie Walsh, Chief Executive, British Airways.
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companies declared Terminal 5 as a ‘known risk’ and 
would therefore not compensate travellers for  
lost baggage.
The corporate consequences were severe, with British 
Airways suffering a loss of reputation.  The financial 
cost to the company was reported to be £16m in the 
final five days of March 2008 alone and traffic volumes 
in March/April 2008 were down from 5.6m to 5.3m 
passengers year-on-year (although, as always, this could 
be due to a mix of factors).  As for the British Airports 
Authority, the bad publicity has stimulated the debate 
over their control of the three major London airports.  
In addition, affected airlines and retailers have sought 
compensation.  For example, passenger throughput 
at Terminal 5 was down from the projected 70,000 
to 40,000 per day (owing to the postponement of 
the transfer of long-haul flights) resulting in a loss of 
business and some closures of airport shops.
While the ‘go live’ difficulties appeared to come as a 
surprise to all concerned, there have been plenty of 
warnings of this danger, not only from other airport 
openings (such as Denver and Hong Kong, which also 
had significant baggage handling problems) but also 
from many other large scale projects.  Some of these, 
such as the new distribution centres for Sainsbury’s 
were also well publicised, with the availability of goods 
in the shops being disrupted, their market share falling 
and their share price being affected.
Cranfield research
Prior to the Terminal 5 debacle, a research 
study was conducted by Cranfield School of 
Management and facilitated by The Chartered 
Institute of Logistics and Transport (UK).  A survey 
of 27 automation implementation projects was 
conducted to answer the following questions:
How often is customer service disrupted   •	
  during the ‘go live’ phase of such projects?
What are the main reasons for disruption?•	
What lessons can be learned?•	
The projects were all based at distribution 
centres that had implemented automated 
equipment, such as storage and retrieval systems 
(ie computer controlled cranes for pallet or 
case storage), conveyors and sortation systems 
(ie similar technology to the baggage handling 
system at Terminal 5), order picking systems 
(such as automated dispensers), and unloading / 
loading equipment.  Approximately half of these 
automation projects were in new buildings as at 
Terminal 5 and about half in existing buildings.
The results showed that almost 80% of 
implementations involved some disruption to 
the ongoing operation, with 33% experiencing 
moderate or extensive disruption (see Figure 1).
Placed in this context, it should therefore not 
have been surprising that Terminal 5 experienced 
difficulties at the time of opening.  The survey also 
found that the sites which suffered from major 
disruptions tended to have much shorter ‘ramp 
up’ times, with only one month being allowed on 
average for the full operation being transferred, 
whereas the other sites allowed an average of 
three months.  Interestingly,  the plan at Terminal 5 
was for an initial 350 flights per day, followed by a 
further 120 long-haul flights within a month.  The 
long-haul flights were later staged over a seven 
month period, after the initial opening difficulties.
The reasons for the disruptions, as quoted by 
the survey sites were wide ranging (see Figure 2), 
including the information technology system, the 
equipment installation, the building construction 
and the impact of new technology on people.  This 
range of reasons indicates the multi-disciplinary 
nature of such projects.
Operational planning
The key question which remains is whether 
management in companies are fully aware of 
the importance of operational planning and 
preparations for the ‘go live’ period. In our 
survey, only one company mentioned they had 
a detailed plan for the ongoing operation and 
this company experienced no service level dip.  
In the case of Terminal 5, the Chief Executive 
of British Airways advised the Transport Select 
Committee that the building programme 
was, in fact, not 100% complete and this 
compromised testing.  At the same hearing, 
the Chief Executive of the British Airports 
Authority advised that 28 of the terminal’s 
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Figure 1: Extent of disruption to the ongoing operation
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Factors % of respondents
  IT system   32%
Equipment installation 27%
Consolidation of sites 11%
Building construction 6%
Impact of new technology on people 6%
Failure of people to work on time 6%
Equipment not performing to specification 6%
Extended hand-over time 6%
Figure 2: Reasons for disruption to the 
ongoing operation
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275 lifts were not operational on day one.  It 
was reported that a discussion took place as 
to whether to scale down or postpone the 
opening but, presumably, it was decided that 
the risk of a significant disruption was very low.  
With hindsight, the Chief Executive of British 
Airways stated that he regretted that decision 
and the one major lesson learned was that 
the planned six month testing period should 
not have been compromised.  This should act 
as a valuable lesson for all management teams 
involved in major projects.
Potential risk to customer 
service
The potential effect of automation projects on 
customer service levels can be depicted by a 
‘service level dip’ (see Figure 3).  The intention 
of the project is often to improve customer 
service levels but, in the short-term, it needs to 
be recognised that there is a significant risk of 
a reduction in those service levels – unless the 
‘go live’ period receives the senior management 
attention that it deserves.
Success factors
A key measure of success for any project must be 
what customers experience immediately after the 
‘go live’ date.  There are three important lessons 
from our research and from the experience at 
Terminal 5.  Firstly, a key component of any project 
should be a detailed plan of exactly how the 
operation will continue through the ‘go live’ period.  
This should include risk assessments of what could 
go wrong in this critical period and contingency 
plans for every potential eventuality.  Secondly, the 
testing, training and commissioning programme 
should be seen as an essential part of the project.  
It is not something that can be ‘squeezed’ if other 
elements of the project overrun.  Finally, the ramp-
up of the operations should be realistic.  ‘Teething 
problems’ and ‘snagging’ are normal in all large 
infrastructure projects and therefore the scale of 
the operation should be increased gradually so that 
these problems can be rectified without affecting 
customer service.  
Managers are frequently ‘bullish’ about projects and 
often it is regarded as being ‘negative’ to add a word 
of caution or realism to the discussions.  A letter 
by Alan Braithwaite, visiting professor at Cranfield 
School of Management, to the Financial Times 
stated that: “T5 shows a troubling lack of corporate 
memory and learning”, as there have been many 
prior instances of such events.  All managers need 
to consider how to incorporate these important 
lessons from the past into their projects.  
For further information contact the author at
peter.baker@cranfield.ac.uk
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Figure 3 : Service level dip, potentially arising from 
warehouse automation projects
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Have operational management ‘driven’ 
the project throughout?
- if not, have they been responsible overall for  
 the ‘go live’ plan?
- do they have any concerns?
Is there a detailed plan for ‘go live’?
Does this include:
- hour-by-hour, and day-by-day, detail of the   
  ongoing operation?
- risk assessment of what could go wrong?
- contingency plans for each eventuality?
Has full testing, training and 
commissioning been conducted?
- have staff been fully involved, are they  
 supportive and do they have any concerns?
- have all person / machine / system interfaces  
 been properly assessed?
- is everything working fully?
- if not, what will be the impact of any  
 ongoing ‘snagging’?
Is the ‘ramp-up’ realistic?
- will there be time for problems to be 
	 identified	and	rectified	as	the	scale	of	the		
 operation increases?
- is there a contingency in place so that 
 ‘ramp-up’ can be slowed?
- if a rapid ‘ramp-up’ is necessary by the nature
 of the project,  has there been any   
 compromise of the testing programme?
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Check list for 
the ‘go live’ 
period:
